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RISK MANAGEMENT IN (AIR) TRANSPORT WITH EXEMPLARY 
RISK ANALYSIS BASED ON THE TOLERABILITY MATRIX 
 
Summary. This article is a continuation of the authors’ study on the ways to ensure 
safety in the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system. It directly refers to the processes of 
risk management involving, in particular, risk management in (air) transport. The main 
aim of this paper is to present and indicate the hazard identification and risk assessment 
tools that can be used in air transport and to apply one of them for a risk analysis of a 
specific ATM originating case. This is why, after a short introduction, describing the 
background of the research as well as literature review, the risk management process as 
such is characterized. It is shown in a schematic way and its main components are 
identified. At the same time, from the entire management process, the risk assessment 
procedure is highlighted as its most crucial part. Then, general hazards identification 
techniques, risk analysis and assessment tools are described, with an indication that they 
can also be implemented in air transport, if compatible with ICAO Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPs). In the following part, the process of risk assessment in 
air transport, based on the Safety Management Manual, using a safety risk tolerability 
matrix, is characterized. Finally, in this article, an exemplary risk analysis is carried out, 
focusing on a selected case arising from the ATM field. For the analysed case, safety risk 
hazards and their possible effects are identified and then assigned to the Intolerable, 
Tolerable and Acceptable regions. 
The entire paper is summarized and conclusions are drawn in relation to the 
publication’s main goal. Attention is also paid to the potential causes of appearance of 
hazards including, first of all, lack of adequate verification procedures, as well as 
people’s competence and last but not the least human errors, being the reason for 70-80% 
of unwanted transport accidents. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The history of creation of risk management standards dates back to 1995, when the technical 
committees of standardization organizations from Australia and New Zealand merged, at the same 
time publishing the first AN/ANS 4360 standard – Risk Management. Two years later, Canada 
published its own version of this document, while, in 2001, Japan did so. Finally, the following year, 
the ISO organization published the IEC Guide 73 Risk Management – terminology, a glossary of 
terms used in the risk management process and, in 2004, the ISO 31000 Risk Management standard, 
which, slightly modified, is still in effect today as a second edition dated 2018. The ISO organization, 
in its standards, recommends developing a risk management strategy to describe how this process will 
be included in the activities of a given undertaking. 
Risk can be expressed in terms of the frequency or probability of hazardous events or losses caused 
by non-occurrences over a specified period of time. The same safety criterion, which isa formula that 
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calculates the level of risk that a particular community accepts, is used. Understanding the level of risk 
and development of safety criteria are carried out through a so-called risk assessment including the 
likelihood of occurrence category. Along with the degrees of risk, one can define them as 
unacceptable, undesirable, acceptable under control and acceptable. Collection of reliable information 
from various sources to enable safety analysis to prevent aviation incidents is referred to as a safety 
management strategy. A chance to reduce the risk understood as a threat appears thanks to corrective, 
preventive and improving actions application. This happens as part of the implementation of a 
proactive safety management strategy, where it is necessary to take continuous actions in the field of 
hazard identification and risk analysis, and take preventive actions adequately according to the results 
of analyses [17]. 
Aviation faces a variety of risks on a daily basis, many of which can pose a threat to the continued 
existence of users. In fact, risk is a by product of doing business. Not all risks can be eliminated and 
not all risk-mitigation measures are financially feasible. The risks and costs specific to aviation create 
the need for a rational decision-making process. Everyday decisions are made in real time, where the 
probability and severity of any negative risk consequences and the expected benefits of taking risks 
are weighted. This process is known as risk management. 
The development of research on the prevention of adverse aviation events has given managers of 
aviation organizations tools that allow the determination of variables that favour the occurrence of 
dangerous situations. Awareness of the existence of risk provides a chance to take action that is 
appropriate to mitigate it and control the risk factors. In this case, the dynamics and scope of 
preparation and implementation of air operations, as well as their environment, make full control over 
risk factors impossible. In a situation where it is impossible to completely eliminate danger in aviation, 
measures should be taken to minimize its frequency and its effects. This means that security should be 
considered on the basis of probability theory [15]. 
EUROCONTROL defines the human factor as a multidisciplinary effort to develop and introduce 
knowledge of how people work and to apply this knowledge to improve the relationship between 
employees, technologies and the tasks that they are assigned, as well as the work environment to work 
effectively in safe conditions. It is a complex discipline that considers issues affecting the performance 
of people and systems. This is reflected in the study of the genesis of research on the human factor: 
their goal is to improve system - man cooperation. The introduction of the results of these tests into the 
ATM system provides a broader view on all aspects of the human factor, increases work efficiency 
and the level of security, and reduces the costs of using the system in the long run. 
An interesting issue was highlighted in a publication From Safety-I to Safety-II: A White Paper [9], 
where the authors noticed an evolution in risk perception. While in Safety-I vision there was a belief 
that accidents or incidents occur because something goes wrong and one can thoroughly examine the 
cause and identify a solution, in Safety-II, the purpose of investigations shifts towards an 
understanding of how things usually go right. 
In the literature review, there is a clear and strong focus on risk management in aviation. Both 
service providers and regulatory institution are aware that there is a need to continuously improve 
safety levels in ATM (Air Traffic Management). EUROCONTROL developed a reporting framework 
aligned with EU and ICAO regulations, the Toolkit for ATM Occurrence Investigation (TOKAI), 
which allows structured and unified reporting for Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) [19]. 
Rios Insua et al. show a framework for risk management decisions in aviation safety at the state level 
with a novel and systematic methodology for risk management based on the principles of decision and 
risk analysis [21]. A procedure of strengthening air traffic safety management by moving from 
outcome-based towards risk-based evaluation of runway incursions is described by Stroeve et al. in 
[23]. Also, a quantitative model for assessing aviation safety risk factors as a means of increasing the 
effectiveness of a safety risk management system by integrating the fuzzy linguistic scale method, 
failure mode, effects and criticality analysis principle was shown by Wen-Kuei Lee [25]. Similarly, 
Hadjimichael [7] presented the Flight Operations Risk Assessment System (FORAS). The author 
defined it as a risk modelling methodology that represents risk factors and their interrelationships as a 
fuzzy expert system. FORAS is supposed to systematize the process of eliciting human expertise, 
provide for a natural representation of the knowledge in an expert system and automate the process of 
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risk assessment. Fortunately, scientists also identified a possibility to forecast and assess the 
consequences of aviation safety occurrences [22]. 
For the sake of assessment of the significant influence of the human factor on safety in general, 
many publications are directly devoted to this topic. They are even sociological in nature. Xuecai & 
Deyong introduced a new method to assess and manage human factors [27]. A new procedure called 
Human Factor Risk Management (HFRM) was developed in [2] by Bevilacqua & Ciarapica or an 
innovative prognostic risk assessment tool for the manufacturing sector based on the management of 
the human, organizational and technical/technological factors in [5] by Djapan et al. Risk assessment 
is also used to detect the hazards associated with dangerous workplaces in aviation, reported in [1] or 
[18]. 
Generally, the issue of risk management in transport can be found in various literature publications 
e.g. Di Gravio et al. [4], Tamasi and Demichela [24], and those already mentioned before. However, 
taking into account the multitude of available methods as well as continuous modifications in the 
ATM system, further analysis and publications are required, especially in reference to safety (human 
safety as well as the safety of systems and infrastructure) and practical operational problems. This is 
why the main aim of this paper is to present and describe the hazard identification and risk assessment 
tools that can be used in air transport and to apply one of them for a risk analysis of a specific ATM 
case – the recent implementation of free route airspace in Poland – POLFRA, which has direct impact 
on flight operations safety and is currently up to date. This article is structured as follows: analysis of 
the process of risk management and assessment are presented in chapter 2, an exemplary risk analysis 
with the initial conclusions drawn are described in chapter 3 and summary and conclusions are 
presented in chapter 4. 
 
 
2. RISK MANAGEMENT AND ASSESSMENT 
 
Risk management is one of the basic components of a safety management system; it plays an 
important role in the entire process of safety assurance. Safety risk management, according to its 
definition [11], is a generic term that encompasses the assessment and mitigation of the safety risks of 
the consequences of hazards that adversely affect the capabilities of an organization, to a level as low 
as reasonably practicable (ALARP). In other words, risk management refers to a coordinated set of 
activities and methods that is used to direct an organization and to control the many risks that can 
affect its ability to achieve objectives. Its main purpose is the creation and protection of value. 
According to [14], risk is the “effect of uncertainty on objectives” and an effect is a positive or a 
negative deviation from what is expected. The level of risk is its magnitude. It is estimated by 
considering and combining consequences and likelihoods. A level of risk can be assigned to a single 
risk or to a combination of risks. 
Although this approach is not necessarily new, still, due to the fact that nowadays organizations of 
all types and sizes face a number of threats (which may affect the achievement of their basic goals), it 
has become clear that all those risks must be managed somehow. 
 
2.1. Risk management process 
 
Risk management processes as such are based on ISO international standards series 31000. Two 
main documents worth mentioning in this context are (1) ISO 31000:2018: Risk management – 
Guidelines [14], which provide guidelines on managing the risk faced by organizations as well as 
a common approach to managing any type of risk that is not industry or sector specific, and (2) IEC 
31010:2019: Risk management – Risk assessment techniques [12], which provide summaries as well 
as guidance on the selection and application of techniques for assessing risk in a wide range of 
situations. Based on those two standards, the process of risk management may be presented in the 
form of a diagram shown in figure 1. 
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Fig. 1. Risk management process showing risk assessment contribution (own work based on [12]) 
 
The risk management process consists of the following basic components: 
1. communication and consultation on risk management, 
2. establishing internal and external context, as well as the context of risk management, which, in 
practice, means the analysed system’s or process’ (and its environment) identification, 
3. defining of risk criteria, 
4. risk assessment, consisting of hazards’ identification, risk analysis and evaluation, 
5. determination of a risk management strategy, in terms of its effectiveness, 
6. risk mitigation (if necessary), 
7. monitoring and review and 
8. risk management process documentation. 
 
Each part of the risk management process is important and should be integrated with all the other 
stages of the process. They all form a complete systemic approach and each of them is important for 
the proper functioning of the others. For example, defining of risk criteria enables the correct 
assessment of the analysed situation, while risk assessment provides basis/ideas for risk mitigation 
procedures. However, the most essential factor and the one that is indicated the most often is the risk 
assessment process. 
 
2.2. Risk assessment 
 
Risk assessment identifies how objectives may be affected (hazard’s identification), and analyses 
the risk in terms of consequences, probability and potential cause (risk analysis) before deciding 
whether further action is necessary (risk evaluation). Proper identification of hazards, determination of 
their consequences and probability of occurrence as well as potential causes are the basis of 
appropriate risk management. 
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This is why some fundamental questions need to be answered [12]: 
1. What can happen and why? 
2. What can the consequences be? 
3. What is the probability of occurrence? 
4. What is the potential cause? 
5. What can be done to mitigate the consequence of incompatibility and/or reduce the probability 
of its occurrence and/or eliminate its potential causes? 
6. Is the level or risk tolerable or acceptable or is further treatment required? 
 
The bases for risk assessment are historical knowledge, observation of similar systems, expert 
knowledge, experience of analysts and last but not the least dedicated techniques developed along with 
technical progress. It is the 31010 standard [12] that provides a summary of the tools used for risk 
assessment classified in terms of their suitability for risk identification, valuation of frequency and 
effects, effectiveness of deployment as a control tool as well as risk evaluation. Each described tool is 
characterized by it applicability, inputs, process description, outputs and limitations. On this basis, the 
most popular tools have been assigned to be useful in the subsequent processes of risk assessment: 
hazards’ identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation as shown in figure 2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Applicability of the tools used in risk assessment (own work based on [12]) 
 
The question that arises is whether the methods presented in figure 2 and assigned to the mentioned 
stages of the risk assessment process can be used in transport (most of all in air transport) or is there 
some other specific approach dedicated to air transport?  
It is known that air transport is a discipline with strong legal regulations. What must also be taken 
into account, while answering the question, is the rule in force in aviation to proceed only in 
accordance with specific standards or recommended practices (SARPs ICAO) or acceptable means of 
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compliance (AMC EASA); the purpose of establishment and acceptance is uniform safety assurance. 
However, the methods and tools described above, originating from international ISO standards, are not 
in conflict the mentioned principle. This is why the answer to the first part of the question is yes, that 
is, the presented methods can be deployed in air transport. Moreover, a look at the current literature 
confirms this statement as FMEA and HAZOP, for example, were used to analyse risk in the authors’ 
other publications [6, 16]. 
 
2.3. Risk tolerability matrix 
 
Nevertheless, the answer to the second part of the question, focusing on special risk management 
methods in air transport, is also confirmative, as there is an approach based on the ICAO Safety 
Management Manual [11] of risk analysis based on the safety risk tolerability matrix. Moreover, strict 
air transport procedures require that safety management is proactive, systematic and transparent [11]. 
According to the Polish State Safety Program [20], risk management covers two aspects: 
§ processes of hazards identification and 
§ processes of risk assessment and mitigation, 
which partly cover the approach from fig. 2 and form the core of the entire process, presented in 
fig. 3. 
The idea of risk management in the SMS concept can be explained based on its visual 
representation – as a triangle in an inverted position (figure 3) – “top-heavy” from a safety risk 
perspective [11].  
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Safety risk management – region identification (own work based on [11]) 
 
Most risks of the consequences of hazards fall initially into the intolerable (unacceptable) region – 
NA, which, in practice, means that they are unacceptable under any circumstances and mitigation 
actions are immediately required. A smaller number of risks are assessed as falling into tolerable 
region – T, which means that risk is acceptable, but the probability and severity of the consequences of 
those hazards must be permanently controlled. The fewest numbers of risks fall into the acceptable 
region – A; therefore, no further action to mitigate them or of control is required at the moment. 
 
The research conducted on aeronautical safety manuals and standards (such as SMM – ICAO Doc. 
9859 [11] or Annex 19 [10]) confirms that safety risk in an air transport system should be expressed as 
a combination of the following two variables: the probability P and the effect (severity) S of an event. 
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To correctly assess analysed risks against the consequences of a hazard, it is necessary to qualify 
assessment scales for both the values mentioned. 
The criteria for estimating the safety risk occurrence probability on a five-point scale, according to 
[11], are as follows: 
1 – Extremely improbable, meaning that it is almost inconceivable that the event will occur, 
2 – Improbable, meaning very unlikely to occur or not known to have occurred, 
3 – Remote, meaning unlikely to occur, but possible or has occurred rarely, 
4 – Occasional, meaning likely to occur sometimes or has occurred infrequently, and 
5 – Frequent, meaning likely to occur many times or has occurred frequently. 
 
Similar a five-point scale, based on [11], may be presented for the safety risk severity of an event 
as follows:  
1 – Negligible, meaning no influence on safety, little consequences, 
2 – Minor, meaning inconsiderable influence on safety such as minor incident, operating 
      limitations and/or use of emergency procedures, 
3 – Major, meaning significant safety threat such as serious incident and/or injury to persons, 
4 – Hazardous, meaning serious safety threat such as serious injuries and/or major equipment 
     damage, and 
5 – Catastrophic, meaning huge safety threat, such as multiple deaths and/or equipment destroyed. 
 
Determination of these criteria enables risk evaluation and assignment of the hazards to the risk 
levels shown in table 1. At the same time, it enables the identification of the influence of each hazard 
on process’ safety in reference to the entire air traffic management process. 
 
Table 1 
Safety risk tolerability matrix (own work based on [11]) 
 
Risk probability 
Risk severity 
Neglig. 
1 
Minor 
2 
Major 
3 
Hazard. 
4 
Catastr. 
5 
Extremely 
improbable                 1 A A A A A 
Improbable                 2 T T T A A 
Remote                       3 NA T T T A 
Occasional                 4 NA NA T T T 
Frequent                     5 NA NA NA T T 
 
 
3. EXEMPLARY RISK ANALYSIS 
 
As earlier in this article the adequate tools, processes and procedures were shown, here, an 
exemplary risk analysis is presented. It was decided to present a case from the Air Traffic 
Management (ATM) system, as this area is of interest to the authors and the changes implemented in 
the system are up to date. One of the new functionalities added recently to the ATM system is Flexible 
Airspace Management and Free Route [3]. Free Route Airspace (FRA), known as POLFRA in Poland, 
according to its definition [26], is a specified airspace within which users may freely plan a route 
between a defined entry point and a defined exit point, with the possibility to route via intermediate 
(published) waypoints, without reference to the ATS route network, subject to airspace availability. 
Within this airspace, flights remain subject to air traffic control. In other words, the idea of free 
routing is to allow airspace users to fly as close to their preferred trajectories as possible, so that their 
flight routes are the shortest, the quickest and the most efficient. A more detailed description of this 
new functionality can be found in [3, 6, 26]. Here, the main idea is to conduct risk analysis of its 
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implementation in Poland, based on the risk tolerability matrix, described in Section 2.3. Poland was 
selected as a natural exemplary location. However, it must be noted in a similar manner, identification 
and analysis of hazards can be conducted for any another European country, as the modifications to 
the ATM system are based on EU regulations. Moreover, they represent the background for the Single 
European Sky Air Traffic Research and Development (SESAR) project as well as the idea of Single 
European Sky (SES). The risk tolerability matrix method was chosen in this example to show the risk 
assessment process because of its simplicity. Nevertheless, the assessment must include all three 
stages: hazards’ identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. 
 
3.1. Hazards’ identification 
 
The first stage has already been addressed in one of the author’s previous publications [5]. The 
approach presented and application of the results were different, but a similar method was applied. 
Bearing the potential incompatibilities identified in [6] in mind, it can be considered that the hazards 
related to POLFRA implementation may be divided into three basic groups (figure 4) as follows: 
§ aeronautical data and information preparation, 
§ operational use of published aeronautical data and information, and 
§ compatibility. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Recognition of safety hazards (own work) 
 
The question that may arise after the recognition of safety hazards is why do they all focus on 
analysing data and information preparation and final use? The reason for this is simple: deployment of 
POLFRA does not require changes to the existing material assets such as infrastructure or aeronautical 
systems’ components, and even if required, the changes are minor. However, changes in airspace 
structure and functioning require the publication of modified data and information (such as 
departing/arrival connecting points, FRA boundaries for specific flight levels, etc.), which must be 
available for all airspace users and are published in Aeronautical Information Publication AIP Polska. 
This is why the identification of hazards focuses on these as well as the subsequent risk assessment. 
The third group, compatibility, refers to the arrangements with other (neighbouring) countries (Baltic 
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FAB for example), according to the cross-border character of air transport, as well as the relationships 
with other ATM functionalities and systems. 
 
3.2. Risk analysis and evaluation 
 
As the first risk management component, identification of hazards, is already completed, it is time 
to focus on the other areas: risk analysis and evaluation. It is necessary to estimate the values of the 
probability of occurrence of hazards, P, and the severity of their consequences, S, according to the 
presented criteria. In the risk evaluation process, three levels of risk were identified [11]: acceptable – 
A, tolerable – T and intolerable (unacceptable) – NA. The hazards identified must be assigned into one 
of those three groups. 
The first aspect that may be noted is, in the authors’ opinion, the fact that the assignment of 
hazards’ to risk levels is not very accurate, as the division scale consists of three regions only. More 
allowable assignment regions would allow a more precise division, but can make the analysis more 
complicated. The method based on the safety risk tolerability matrix seems to be a simple and quite 
quick method of identification of hazards’ criticality. However, due to its not so high accuracy, it 
would be advised to use it as a preliminary study. If a more precise division is necessary, it is 
recommended to apply one of the more complex risk analysis methods such as FMEA/FMECA with a 
quantitative result or a method from a different pool of solutions such as fuzzy sets. 
Nevertheless, the risk tolerability matrix and criteria for probability and severity determination 
were applied to assess the risks of POLFA implementation. Three independent experts were asked to 
present their opinion and assess the parameters P and S according to the rules presented in Section 2.3. 
It must be taken into account that the results obtained may be subjective, as in any risk analysis. If 
they were to be used operationally, it should be considered whether or not to increase the number of 
evaluating experts, for a more balanced assessment. The results of the analysis carried out in this paper 
are presented in table 2. 
 
       Table 2 
Risk assessment for POLFRA based on the safety risk tolerability matrix (own work) 
 
No Safety risk hazards - POLFRA Possible effect P S R 
Aeronautical data and information preparation  
1a 
Determination of 
entry, exit and 
intermediate points 
Incorrect determination of 
entry, exit and intermediate 
points 
Creation of incorrect data and charts; 
serious incident involving two (or 
more) aircraft 
2 3 T 
1b Incompatibility in AIP Polska publication 
Lack of information publication in 
the correct form, place and time; 
operational use of incorrect data; 
aeronautical accident involving two 
(or more) aircraft; aircraft's 
destruction 
3 5 NA 
2a 
Determination of 
departure/arrival 
connecting points 
Incorrect determination of 
departure/arrival connecting 
points 
Creation of incorrect data and charts; 
serious incident involving two (or 
more) aircraft 
2 3 T 
2b Incompatibility in AIP Polska publication 
Lack of information publication in 
the correct form, place and time; 
operational use of incorrect data; 
aeronautical accident involving two 
(or more) aircraft; aircraft's 
destruction 
3 5 NA 
3 
Publication of 
information in 
different forms 
Inconsistency between 
published written information 
and published charts 
Operational use of incorrect data, 
serious incident involving two (or 
more) aircraft 
2 4 T 
4 DCT (Direct Routing) determination 
Incompatibility in DCTs 
publication 
Incorrect route planning through 
restricted areas 3 5 NA 
Operational use of published aeronautical data and information  
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No Safety risk hazards - POLFRA Possible effect P S R 
5a 
Route planning 
Route planning through areas 
where POLFRA is not 
applicable: DA, TMA, CTR 
Aeronautical accident involving two 
(or more) aircraft; aircraft's 
destruction 
2 3 T 
5b 
Entry into the POLFRA area 
from airports located in FIR 
Warszawa from other points 
than those defined in the 
departure connecting point 
Traffic congestion around defined 
connecting points; aircrafts’ 
separation minima infringement; 
serious incident involving two (or 
more) aircraft 
3 4 T 
5c 
Exit from the POLFRA area 
into the airport's CTR through 
other point than that defined in 
the arrival connecting point 
Safety risk; aeronautical accident 
involving two (or more) aircraft; 
aircraft's destruction 
3 4 T 
6a 
Traffic management 
Traffic congestion around 
defined entry/exit points 
Serious incident involving two (or 
more) aircraft; negative effects for 
the environment; additional use of 
fuel 
2 3 T 
6b Aircraft separation minima infringement 
Serious incident involving two (or 
more) aircrafts 2 4 T 
6c Conflicts in planned routes 
Urgent need to re-plan the route; 
delays, dissatisfaction; if not detected 
- aeronautical accident involving two 
(or more) aircraft; aircraft's 
destruction 
3 5 NA 
Compatibility  
7a 
Cross-border 
arrangements 
Implementation delays Incomplete application of the expected effects; dissatisfaction 2 2 A 
7b 
Lack of compatibility of 
POLFRA significant points 
and DCTs  located on FIR 
Warszawa boundaries with 
other countries’ arrangements 
(Baltic FAB, Germany, 
Ukraine, Scandinavia) 
Impossible deployment of FRA at an 
international level; incomplete 
application of the expected effects 
2 2 A 
8 
Interdependencies 
and compatibility 
with other ATM 
functions/systems 
Lack of compatibility with 
other ATM functions and 
systems (such as SWIM, 
ATFCM, etc.) 
Impossible full deployment of FRA 
at national and international levels 2 1 A 
 
3.3. Discussion of the results 
 
To draw proper conclusions, the results obtained are summarized in table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Risk evaluation of POLFRA deployment summary 
 
Risk level Number of results obtained Number of results obtained in % 
A 3 20% 
T 8 53,33% 
NA 4 26,67% 
 Total: 15 100 % 
  
The observations made and related directly to table 2 are as follows: 
§ Most of the results fall into the T region, with the rest in the A region (see table 3). 
§ In case of selected results (case 6c for example), the experts’ opinion varied and the results 
themselves could have been assigned to two different regions. For example, P = 3 and S = 5 
assign the result into the NA region. However, changing the P value to P = 2 while keeping S = 5 
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(as one of the experts proposed) would assign the result into the T region. In case of experts’ 
divergent assessments, the more rigorous selection was chosen. 
§ In each NA situation detected, the S variable is very high (in all cases, it is the maximum value – 
5), while the P variable has a medium (3) value. Each time NA detected concerns related to 
aeronautical data and information publication, mostly AIP Polska, which is relevant as this 
publication is the main basis for safe planning and conduct of flights, and information published 
therein must always be up to date and correct. Failure to comply with this results in 
“catastrophic” consequences in practice and is assigned the number 5 in table 2. 
§ In the entire table, regardless of the line, severity is generally assigned a bigger number than 
probability, which means that it is easier not to allow a situation to happen than to mitigate its 
consequences, which is in agreement with the proactive safety approach. 
§ Safety hazards belonging to the third group – compatibility are all assigned to the A region, 
which seems to be relevant as the hazards mentioned therein do not affect flight safety in a direct 
way. 
 
Risk analysis, based on the risk tolerability matrix, focuses on the assessment of the appearance of 
incompatibilities and their possible effect. It does not concentrate on identifying the risk/hazards 
mitigation activities Such approach is a standard procedure in HAZOP or FMEA analysis. 
Nevertheless, analysis conducted in the third chapter of this paper and summed up in table 2 allows 
indication of some corrective actions. Corrective or preventive actions = risk mitigation of the 
expected hazards. For the first group of identified hazards, in terms of aeronautical data and 
information creation, it would be recommended to (1) implement verification procedures in the 
subsequent stages of the entire aeronautical data and information chain, which means during data 
request, creation, publication, etc.; (2) carefully study the documentation before data preparation; and 
(3) designate a competent person according to the task to be done (as most incompatibilities appear as 
human errors). 
For the second group of described hazards, Operational use of published aeronautical data and 
information, the identified recommendations are as follows: (1) implementation of verification 
procedures once again, (2) correct route planning and traffic management, (3) perfect knowledge of 
published information and (4) implementation of applicable tools, if necessary. For the third group, 
compatibility, the risk mitigation activities recommended are as follows: (1) proactive approach and 
active operation, and (2) implementation of other required functionalities. 
The next topic, which should be summed up, is the evaluation procedure. As mentioned before, in 
some cases, the experts’ opinions varied, which is natural as risk evaluation is subjective by nature. 
Despite this, it was proposed that some reference values be prepared for the frequency of appearance 
of incompatibilities and, at the same time, the probability of their appearance, to increase the 
objectivity of the entire assessment. The reference values, presented in table 4, are authors’ 
suggestions based on a literature review. However, it is noteworthy that specific values in a risk 
analysis evaluation process are rather rare. 
 
Table 4 
Frequency of appearance of incompatibilities’ assessment criteria 
(own work based on [8, 13]) 
 
Safety risk 
occurrence Value 
Frequency 
of incompatibilities’ 
appearance 
[in a thousand cases] 
Probability 
of incompatibilities’ 
appearance 
Extremely improbable 1 ≤ 0,01 ≤ 1 x10-5 
Improbable 2 0,1 ÷ 0,5  1÷ 5 x10-4 
Remote 3 1 ÷ 5 1÷ 5 x10-3 
Occasional 4 10 ÷ 50 1÷ 5 x10-2 
Frequent 5 ≥ 100 ≥ 1 x10-1 
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The other parameter, safety risk severity, seems to be defined clearly on the five-point scale, 
attributing possible effects (such as serious injuries and/or major equipment damage) to each of the 
scale numbers. 
 
 
4. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS 
 
Risk is an integral part of our lives. It appears in various situations and must be evaluated, and then 
accepted or mitigated. Risk management provides a consecutive set of activities and methods to 
control the unwanted impact of appearing hazards. The same procedures may be used in different 
applications. In this article, the method of dealing with risks was shown in a schematic way, in the 
form of an expanded risk management process diagram, and then widely discussed in relation to air 
transport. The tools used for risk assessment were also identified and divided into three main 
assessment parts: hazards’ identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation. All the methods presented 
in the paper can be applied in any type of transport including air transport. At the same time, the case, 
analysed in the second part of the publication, aims at facilitating the understanding of one of the 
described methods thanks to its practical implementation. In the third chapter, a selected case arising 
from the ATM field was examined, which means that potential hazards were identified and risk was 
evaluated and assigned to one of the three tolerability regions. As a result, the possible effects of 
hazards’ occurrence were described and risk mitigation activities, derived from the analysis were 
highlighted. Finally, the reference values for the frequency of occurrence of incompatibilities were 
suggested. Moreover, on the basis of all these considerations, the main aim of this article, presented in 
the introduction, is achieved. 
It must be emphasized that, above all, risk assessment is a process that is closely related to hazard 
identification. For each hazardous situation, the degree of risk should be determined taking into 
account the probability of occurrence and possible consequences: losses. In risk assessment, the use of 
a scheme in which possible consequences and the probability of occurrence of the given events are 
determined can be helpful. To manage the operational risk of aviation facilities, process approach may 
be applied, in which the universal models used in quality management systems are used. Most 
importantly, risk should be recognized, assessed, neutralized and monitored throughout the entire life 
cycle of the object. 
Discussion on the risk assessment results has already been reported in paragraph 3.3. Now, it is 
time to summarize the entire work. The focus of attention is the proactive safety approach, widely 
implemented in air transport. It is easier and safer (for human and equipment) not to allow a situation 
to happen than to mitigate its consequences. However, such an approach requires identification and 
recognition of hazards before they can even occur in real life. This makes the identification process of 
hazards a challenge. It is also worth mentioning that risk assessment based on a risk tolerability matrix 
does not directly identify the potential causes or the corrective actions proposed. A detailed analysis of 
the results presented in table 2 leads to the conclusion that the main reasons for the appearance of the 
identified hazards are as follows: (1) lack of adequate verification procedures, which should be done 
not only at the end of the mentioned processes (such as aeronautical data and information preparation) 
but also in the subsequent stages, not to allow the incompatibilities to remain in the following stages; 
(2) people’s competence or rather its absence since, irrespective of the transport mode, the quality of 
personnel training processes is a key element affecting human–machine interactions and decision-
making processes later on during the operational phase; moreover, trained reactions are especially 
important in air transport, as due to operations dynamics, decision time is sometimes limited to 
seconds; and (3) human errors (unintended as well as intentional), indolence and ignorance of the 
current situation – all three expressions are treated as synonyms, as statistically, these have been 
proven to be the main reasons affecting transport safety. 
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